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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6317

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 13 SPC MEETING: ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS ON
DETENTE

REF: STATE 249735

SUMMARY: NOVEMBER 13 SPC DETENTE DISCUSSIONS ADDRESSED
CONTRIBUTION PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED BY FRG AND OTHER DELS AS WELL
AS NEW ITALIAN AND CANADIAN QUESTIONS. GENERAL DISCUSSION
PROMPTED LIVELY EXCHANGE ON POSSIBLE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN U.S.
AND EUROPEAN DETENTE PERCEPTIONS. SPC WILL AGAIN DISCUSS DETENTE
ON NOVEMBER 18. END SUMMARY.

1. PRIOR TO NOVEMBER 13 SPC DISCUSSION, ITALIAN AND CANADIAN
DELS CIRCULATED LISTS OF ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS (SEPTTEL) INTENDED
AS FURTHER STIMULI TO ALLIANCE DETENTE CONSULTATIONS.

2. ON BASIS OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM COPENHAGEN, DANISH REP
(VILLADSEN) SAID DENMARK GENERALLY AGREED WITH THE POINTS MADE
IN THE SECRETARY'S SEPTEMBER 19 REMARKS TO THE SENATE FOREIGN
RELATIONS COMMITTEE. IT ESPECIALLY AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY'S
ASSERTION THAT MOST PROMISING DETENTE APPROACH WAS ENTRY INTO
NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENTS WITH MOSCOW SO AS TO CREATE A VESTED
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SOVIET INTERESTING DETENTE. REFERRING TO QUESTIONS POSED BY THE GERMAN
DELEGATION (USNATO 6241), DANISH REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES FOUND
QUESTIONS #1, 2, 5, 6 AND 7 TO BE OF GENERAL INTEREST FOR
MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS. NO ONE BUT THE SOVIETS COULD ANSWER

QUESTION#3; WHILE QUESTIONS#4, 8 AND 11 WERE EITHER RHETORICAL OR DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND. IN ADDITION TO DISCUSSION OF ISSUES LIKE THOSE POSED BY FRG, MINISTERS SHOULD ALSO ASSESS THE POSSIBILITY THAT CHINA MIGHT ACCEPT LONG-STANDING SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A NON-AGGRESSION AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION TO ABOVE, VILLADSEN SAID DANISH FONMIN THOUGHT MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION SHOULD TAKE FOLLOWING FOUR POINTS INTO ACCOUNT: (A) DETENTE MUST BE DISCUSSED IN THE CONTEXT OF OTHER FORMS OF EAST-WEST INTERACTION; (B) SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO CONSIDER ECONOMIC PROGRESS MORE IMPORTANT THAN POLITICAL OR IDEOLOGICAL MATTERS; (C) WEST NEED NOT FEAR EASTERN ECONOMIC COMPETITION SINCE COMMUNIST ECONOMIES ARE SO INEFFICIENT THEY WILL NEVER BE ABLE TO CATCH UP; AND (D) THERE IS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF WESTERN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. WHILE THEY MIGHT STILL WANT ULTIMATELY TO "BURY" THE WEST, SOVIETS REALIZE THIS IS NOT IN THEIR SHORT OR MEDIUM-TERM INTEREST.

3. RESPONDING TO DANISH REP'S COMMENTS ABOUT FRG QUESTIONS, GERMAN REP (BOSS) SAID THAT IN QUESTION #8, THE GERMAN DELEGATION THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO INDICATE THAT ANY REDUCTION IN EAST-WEST MILITARY CONFRONTATION SHOULD NOT COME AT THE PRICE OF SOVIET PRESSURE ON WESTERN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH SUCH VEHICLES AS, FOR EXAMPLE, A CSCE FOLLOW-ON ORGAVANIZATION. FRG QUESTION 11 RAISED ISSUE OF WHETHER DETENTE WOULD PERMIT SOVIETS TO PULL NEUTRAL COUNTRIES LIKE FINLAND, AUSTRIA AND YUGOSLAVIA FURTHER INTO THE SOVIET EE ORBIT.

4. BELGIAN REP (BAL) SAID HIS GOVERNMENT CONCURRED IN VALIDITY OF QUESTIONS HE HAD RAISED PERSONALLY IN LAST SPC DISCUSSION ABOUT CSCE BASKET III ISSUES (PARA 5, USNATO 6242). BELGIAN AUTHORITIES ALSO FOUND QUESTIONS#2, 4, 5, 6, 7 AND 8 IN FRG LIST WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION. REFERRING TO RECENT PONOMAREV STATEMENT IN WARSAW ON WESTERN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, BELGIAN REP ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS, WITH A MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT ECONOMY, WOULD RESIST TAKING ADVANTAGE OF WESTERN ECONOMIC PROBLEMS BECAUSE OF THEIR INTEREST IN DETENTE.
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5. FRENCH REP (CARRAUD) RECITED PREVIOUS FRENCH OBJECTIONS TO SPC DETENTE STUDY AND SUGGESTED SPC EFFORT WOULD ONLY ADD TO LARGELY UNSOLVABLE QUESTIONS AND PROBLEMS FOR MINISTERIAL CONSIDERATION. SPECIFICALLY, FRENCH REP REFERRED AGAIN TO DIFFERENCE IN DETENTE PERCEPTION BETWEEN SUPER POWERS AND EUROPEANS. HE NOTED CANADIAN PRIMIN TRUDEAU'S NAC STATEMENT THAT DETENTE AND DEFENSE MUST PARALLEL EACH OTHER, WHILE EUROPEANS -- BECAUSE OF GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY TO THE SOVIET UNION -- MIGHT WELL STRESS DEFENSE OVER DETENTE.

6. NETHERLANDS REP (BUWALDA) THOUGHT FRG QUESTIONS #2, 7 AND 9 RAISED PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS WITH WHICH THE ALLIANCE MUST DEAL, PARTICULARLY AS THE END OF CSCE DRAWS CLOSE.

HE SUGGESTED THAT ONLY THE BONN GROUP COULD ANSWER FRG QUESTION #3; THAT QUESTION #4 ANSWERED ITSELF SINCE THE WEST WAS COMPETING IDEOLOGICALLY IN THE EAST IN SUCH AREAS AS CSCE BASKET III. WITH REFERENCE TO FRG QUESTION#6, THE DUTCH FELT NATO SHOULD CONSISTENTLY DEMAND IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS UNDER CSCE, AND THAT CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE MIGHT BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS CONTEXT. RE FRG QUESTION #5, DUTCH REP NOTED THAT SOVIETS HAD ALWAYS BRANDED AS ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL PRESSURE ANY WESTERN ECONOMIC OR TECHNOLOGICAL PROPOSALS THEY DID NOT LIKE. MOREOVER, THE DUTCH FELT THAT ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS SHOULD BE ON COMMERCIAL BASIS ENTIRELY, WITH NO PREFERENTIAL CREDIT OR OTHER ECONOMIC CONCESSIONS. ON THE 7TH GERMAN QUESTION, DUTCH ASSUMED THE SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE TO OPPOSE EUROPEAN UNITY, BUT WOULD ULTIMATELY ACCEPT IT IF EUROPEANS CONTINUED STRONG IN THEIR EUROPEAN VOCATION. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT FOR THE EUROPEANS TO CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT THEIR UNITY WAS IN NO WAY DIRECTED AGAINST PARTIES OUTSIDE THE EC.

7. IN MORE GENERAL DISCUSSION, CANADIAN REP (ROY) HOPED THAT ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS WOULD FOCUS ON OPERATIONAL AS WELL AS THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF DETENTE, AND ASKED IF ALLIES SHOULD NOT ALSO ADDRESS POINT AT WHICH WEST MIGHT PURSUE AN EVEN MORE DYNAMIC DETENTE POLICY. CANADIAN REP REFERRED OTH TO QUESTION IN ATALIAN PAPER (SEPTTEL) IDENTIFYING POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES IN EUROPEAN SUPERPOWER APPROACHES TO DETENTE, AS WELL AS TO U.S. REP'S STATEMENT IN NOVEMBER 8 SPC DISCUSSION THAT SOVIETS HAD INTEREST IN DETENTE TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR AND TO CREATE A CONFIDENTIAL

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STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY. IF THE SOVIETS WANTED SUCH STABILITY, COULD OTHER ALLIES DRAW ADVANTAGES IN AREAS OF DETENTE THAT WERE IMPORTANT TO THEM? DO THE SOVIETS, FOR EXAMPLE, BELIEVE THAT ADVANTAGES IN EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS ARE SO IMPORTANT THAT THEY WILL RESIST JEOPARDIZING DETENTE IN OTHER AREAS. ROY DISAGREED WITH CARRAUD'S ASSERTION THAT CANADA MIGHT BE LESS INTERESTED IN DEFENSE THAN THE EUROPEANS.

8. IN FURTHER EXPLAINING HIS REMARKS, FRENCH REP AGAIN NOTED POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH BETWEEN THE SUPER POWERS AND OTHER COUNTRIES. IT WAS IMPORTANT TO EVERYONE THAT NUCLEAR WAR BE AVOIDED, BUT IT WAS CRUCIAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THOSE COUNTRIES IN EUROPE WHO WERE NEIGHBORS OF THE SOVIET UNION, AND WHO HAD "OLD FRIENDS" AMONG THE EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND WHO WERE "USED TO THE PROBLEMS OF THIS CONTINENT", HAD INTERESTS AND FACED DANGERS DIFFERENT FROM THE SUPERPOWERS. THE UNITED STATES, FOR EXAMPLE, SENSES THE POLITICAL DANGER OF THE THREAT OF SOVIET CONTROL OF EUROPE, BUT FOR THE EUROPEANS

THEMSELVES IT IS A MATTER OF SURVIVAL. MOREOVER, BILATERAL DETENTE COULD GO SO FAR AS TO PERMIT A SUPERPOWER AGREEMENT THAT WOULD NOT FULLY TAKE INTO ACCOUNT DIVERGENT INTERESTS

OF THE SMALLER POWERS. IT WAS THEREFORE VITALLY IMPORTANT
FOR ALL ALLIES TO DISCUSS AND BE AWARE OF THESE VARYING
INTERESTS.

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9. NORWEGIAN REP (SELMER) SAID FRENCH REP'S REMARKS PROMPTED
IMPRESSION THAT FRENCH WERE TRYING TO DRAW LINES BETWEEN THE
U.S. AND EUROPE, AND REMINDED THAT CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES
EXIST BETWEEN THE SEVERAL EUROPEAN STATES THEMSELVES. NORWAY,
FOR EXAMPLE, ATTACHES OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE TO U.S.-SOVIET
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS GUARANTEEING NUCLEAR STABILITY. BECAUSE
OF NORWAY'S GEOGRAPHIC POSITION, IT SAW RELATIVELY MINOR DIRECT
ADVANTAGE FROM CSCE AND MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THESE WOULD HAVE
ONLY GEOGRAPHICALLY-LIMITED MILITARY IMPLICATIONS. SALT, ON
THE OTHER HAND, IS VITALLY IMPORTANT TO NORWAY.

10. U.S. REP (PEREZ) NOTICED POSSIBLE TREND IN SPC DEBATE
TO ATTEMPT SEPARATION OF U.S. AND SOVIET DETENTE INTERESTS
FROM THOSE OF EUROPE AND CANADA. HE REMINDED THAT ALL DETENTE
INITIATIVES ARE CARRIED OUT UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF U.S.-
SOVIET NUCLEAR NEGOTIATIONS. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, SECRETARY
KISSINGER'S REFERENCE IN HIS SFRC STATEMENT TO FACT THAT
U.S.- SOVIET DETENTE POLICY IN NO WAY MEANT A DEVALUATION OF
TRADITIONAL ALLIANCE RELATIONS. SECRETARY HAD ALSO STRESSED
THAT U.S. HAD ITS ALLIES VERY MUCH IN MIND IN ALL BILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS, AND THAT ALLIANCE DEFENSES MUST BE MAINTAINED
EVEN IN DETENTE ENVIROMENT.

11. CARRAUD REPLIED THAT HE HAD NO INTENTION OF STRESSING
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DIVERGENCIES IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN DETENTE APPROACHES BUT ONLY

THAT DIFFERENCES OF GEOGRAPHY, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY CAPABILITY DID EXIST. HE ADDED THAT FRANCE TOO CONSIDERED U.S.-SOVIET DETENTE TO HAVE OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE SINCE "WITHOUT IT, WE WOULD ALL BE DESTROYED." FRENCH REP SAID HIS REMARKS WERE ONLY INTENDED TO EMPHASIZE IMPORTANCE FRANCE ATTACHES TO ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS AS MEANS FOR HARMONIZING WESTERN APPROACH.

12. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS AS TO NEXT STEPS IN SPC EFFORT, U.S. REP DREW ON STATE 249735. DEBATE FOLLOWED IN WHICH SOME (CANADIANS, FRENCH, TURKS) THOUGHT THAT GENERAL, MORE SUBSTANTIVE SPC AND NAC DISCUSSION WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO MERE LISTING OF ISSUES AND QUESTIONS AS STIMULUS TO MINISTERIAL DEBATE. OTHERS (BELGIUM, FRG, U.S., NORWAY) BELIEVED MINISTERS WOULD BE ABLE TO HAVE FRUITFUL DISCUSSION WITHOUT PRIOR SPC AND COUNCIL DEBATE AND ATTEMPT AT RESOLUTION OF ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES.

13. SPC AGREED THAT CHAIRMAN'S REPORT COULD BE PREPARED ON BASIS OF SUBMISSIONS UP TO AND INCLUDING THOSE MADE AT FINAL SPC DETENTE DISCUSSION NOVEMBER 18. REPORT WOULD SERVE AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION IN COUNCIL, AND PERHPAS ALSO AS BASIS FOR SECRETARY GENERAL'S REMARKS OPENING DETENTE DISCUSSION AT DECEMBER MINISTERIAL. NORWEGIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT CHAIRMAN'S REPORT STATE AT THE OUTSET AS BASIC POINT OF DEPARTURE, THAT ATLANTIC SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND EXISTING WESTERN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES ARE NOT AT ISSUE, AND THAT NO DISCUSSION OF CHANGING THEM THROUGH DETENTE HAS BEEN OR SHOULD BE INTENDED. THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF SALT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED, BUT CSCE AND MBFR SHOULD ALSO BE SINGLED OUT AS IMPORTNAT ADDITIONS TO THE STRUCTURE OF DETENTE.
PEREZ

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